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ABSTRACT
The Egyptian legal structure has long discriminated against women. Taking nationality
law as an example, it is obvious that all consecutive nationality laws have ignored
women’s right concerning passing on and acquiring nationality. Even after its amendment
in 2004, major gender discrimination still exists. This is caused by the fact that the
nationality law is only a part of the legal system. Consequently, its essence will not
deviate from the patriarchal composition of the overall nature of the legal system. This
paper argues that the existing forms of discrimination in the nationality law correlate with
the broader legal environment. Hence, using law as a tool for social reform in the
nationality law only masks the deeper problem. This is what happened when the
legislators intervened in 2004 to achieve gender equality in the nationality law. Even the
use of strategic litigation has failed on its own to alter the gender discrimination existing
in the nationality law. Though in some cases the court has been successful in bringing
back some rights for women, patriarchy cannot be altered through judgments.
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I.

Introduction:

Egyptian society has long been characterized by its patriarchal nature. This term is
commonly used to refer to any form of male domination in the society. Patriarchy can
also be referred to as the power given to men within boundaries of the family, over wife,
children and other dependents.1 However, the former meaning is the most broadly
accepted definition. Patriarchy does not refer to individuals, but rather to the whole
society in which men and women are participating. A society can be deemed patriarchal
when it promotes male powers through being male dominated, male identified, and male
centered.2
The current patriarchal principles are correlated to the historical role of women in prestate societies. In earlier times, social classification was based on the concept of women
being the property of men. The exchange of women took place as a universal part of
culture, even though it was not equal in all places.3 At that time, even matrimonial
exchange was a way in which women were considered a form of property; marriage was
not established between a man and a woman but between two groups of men whose
women were the object of that exchange.4 Even early philosophers like Aristotle did not
consider women as a part of the political life.5 He adopted a male-dominant model. These
early patriarchal concepts later became part of every culture and social order where it also
became codified through laws and regulations.
In the Middle East, patriarchy is seen in both law and custom.6 Custom is maniftested
through distinguishing between the role of boys and girls from an early age and teaching
each of them to know their role in the society. 7 Similarly, gender inequality in Egypt is
not a recent phenomenon. This ideology has deep roots in the Egyptian community, and
the interrelationship between men and women in Egypt has been the subject of many
1

Judith M. Bennett, History Matters , Patriarchy and the Challenge of Feminism , University of
Pennsylvania Press (2007) , at 55.
2
Id.
3
Levi-Strauss, Claude, The Elementary Structures OF Kinship (1969) at 10, 62.
4
Id.
5
See Aristotle, Politics 1127-30, 1194-97, i.2, 13,1252a-1253a, 1259b-1260b (R. McKeon ed. 1941) as
cited by Janet Rifkin, Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy , 3 HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 83(1980) at 91.
6
Selma Botman, Engendering Citizenship In Egypt New York: Columbia University Press (1999), at 107.
7
Arat Yesim, The patriarchal paradox: women politicians in Turkey (1989), at 18.
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studies.8 Though Egyptian women are classified by their social standard, they commonly
share the same status of being subordinated to men.9 Thus, they are not granted equal
rights in a way parallel to men. Being influenced by the social culture, Egyptian men and
women are raised to believe that men are competent to protect and defend women. They
are also raised to believe that family honor is in the women’s hand. Thus, men’s honor is
derived from controlling women’s bodies, movements and behavior; harsh control is
enforced through inequality in gender, submissive supervision, premature marriage and
circumcision.10 For example, the loss of one’s hymen is much more important than losing
any other part of a women’s body;11 the sacredness of the hymen is behind most honor
cases in Egypt. Thus, women are always under the control of a man. Before marriage,
they are under the supervision of their father, and after marriage, this supervision is
passed on to the husband.12
These patriarchal patterns have been historically transformed into municipal laws. Many
civilizations, if not all, have used legal institutions in order to oppress women.

13

In

Egypt, most of the constitutional committees of consecutive constitutions, parliament
members and those who are competent to apply the law are in male hands. Thus, the state
fundamentally functions through male dominant ideas,14 and the resulting laws, though
appearing reasonable on the surface, promote patriarchy. Every powerful organ of the
state structure is operated by men. From this perspective, women are born and raised to
accept their subordinate position.15 Women are portrayed as being a property of men.16
That being said, most of these paradigm conceptions are set by men. These ideologies

8

The first attempt for spreading awareness published book was published in 1879 by Maryam al Nahas.
She presented some models for women. She was followed by Aisha El-Taymuriyah in 1887 and Qasim
Amin “The Liberation of the Woman” in 1894. See Badran, Margot. Feminists, Islam, and Nation: Gender
and the Making of Modern Egypt. E-book, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press (1995), at 14.
9
Willy & Jansen, Women Without Men (1987) at 2.
10
Fatema Mernissi, virginity and Patriarchy (1982), at 183.
11
Zenie-Ziegler,. In search of shadows: Conversations with Egyptian women (1988), at 104.
12
willy, supra note 9, at 1.
13
Lynne Henderson, Law's Patriarchy, 25 LAW & Soc'y REV. 411 (1991) at 411.
14
Currie, Dawn H., Feminist Encounters With Postmodernism: Exploring the Impasse of Debates on
Patriarchy and Law, Canadian Journal of Women & the Law. , Vol. 5 Issue 1 (1992), at 66.
15
See Suzanne Silk Klein, "Individualism, Liberalism and the New Family Law", University ofToronto
Faculty Law Review 43 (1985), at 116.
16
Dawn H. Currie, Feminist Encounters with Postmodernism: Exploring the Impasse of Debates on
Patriarchy and Law, 5 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 63 (1992), at 5.
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have long been adopted through laws and regulations which continue to be codified in
national laws.
This patriarchal composition of the society has led to a complex gender discriminatory
legal structure. Hence, a closer look at the existing laws demonstrate an explicit
preferential treatment of men at the expense of women. In this paper, I use nationality
law as an example of the discriminatory nature of the Egyptian legal system more
generally. Through examining nationality law, I highlight the discrimination existing in
the nationality law specifically and the legal structure in general.
Nationality has acquired its importance from the fact that it formulates the core of the
state. It defines the formation of population. It is considered as one of the most important
human rights in modern history. Nationality as a legal form has a very significant impact
over women’s rights; it is called the right to have rights17 due to its power to grant
citizenship which afterwards empowers citizens with social, political, cultural and
economic rights which include a reciprocal relation between the state and its subjects.18
Consequently, assessment of the position of women in the nationality law is useful for
examining patriarchy in the Egyptian legal system. The importance of assessing the
nationality law lies in the fact that nationality laws have long been promulgated in
accordance with the same factors affecting other laws in Egypt. Hence, the same grounds
that affect Egyptian laws are mirrored in the nationality law.
In this thesis, I will show how nationality law, as an example in the Egyptian legal
system, has long discriminated against women. I also argue that even though the law was
used as a tool for social change through amending the nationality law in 2004, it has
failed to achieve equality. Even, the use of strategic litigation, though helping nationality
law overcome certain occasions of gender inequality, is not enough on its own to
overcome the discrimination existing in the nationality law. Though adjudication has
been very successful to some extent to achieve equality, it has failed to impose complete
equality. The reason is that the nationality law is only a small part of a patriarchal society
17

Lisa C. Stratton, The Right to Have Rights: Gender Discrimination in Nationality Laws,
77 MINN. L. REV. 195 (1992).
18
Lina Abou-Habib, The 'right to have rights': active citizenship and gendered social entitlements in Egypt,
Lebanon and Palestine, Gender and Development, Vol. 19, No. 3, Citizenship (2011) at 442.
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with a legal structure that does, in all cases, oppose the achievement of satisfactory
equality.
This argument is built in three chapters. The first chapter highlights discrimination
against women in Egyptian laws. I choose some of the most well-known laws for their
gender discrimination to demonstrate how the nationality law is only one example of the
current patriarchal composition. In the second chapter, I compare the opposing points of
view regarding the enactment of the amendment of nationality law no 154 of 2004 and
how this law has been promoted as a tool for social reform. I show how the amendment
of the nationality law of 2004 is not sufficient, as a tool of social reform, to eliminate
discrimination existing in the nationality law. In the last chapter, I define strategic
litigation and describe how it functions. After this, I examine the role of strategic
litigation in Egypt in general and regarding nationality law specifically. This is followed
by an assessment of the role of strategic litigation in achieving gender equality and how it
is not enough on its own to achieve equality.

4

II.

Gender Discrimination in Egyptian laws

This chapter focuses on the gender discrimination that exists in the Egyptian legal
structure. Only major discriminatory laws are discussed in this chapter as a way of
identifying how women’s rights are treated in the Egyptian legal system. The first part
focuses on the definition of discrimination and its manifestations. The second part
discusses women’s protection under consecutive Egyptian constitutions as well as their
representation in the legislative body. The final part shows the existing gender
discrimination in the penal law, personal status law and finally nationality law.
A. Defining Discrimination
Many national and international instruments have tried to define discrimination. It can be
defined as the actions undertaken by a majority group which impose differential and
negative impact over a minority group.19 The International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination define discrimination as:
any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, color, descent,
or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or
impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any
other field of public life.20
In addition, the European Court of Justice in its attempt to define discrimination states
that “discrimination can arise only through the application of different rules to relevantly
similar situations or the application of the same rules to different situations.”21 If we look
closer at the forms of discrimination, we find that it might take a direct form where an act
or law is imposes unequal treatment on a group of people as compared to others.22 It can
also be indirect where equal treatment is applied, but this results in a worse position for a
certain group.23 A clear example for indirect discrimination is where rules treat equally

19

Feagin & Eckberg. Discrimination: Motivation, action, effects and context. Annual Review of Sociology,
(1980) 1–20.
20
The United Nations. “International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination.” Treaty Series, vol. 660, Mar. 1966, art. 1 para. 1.
21
Case C-279/93. Finanzampt Köln-Altstadt v Schumacker (1995) para 30.
22
Ildikó Laki, The concept of discrimination nowadays (2014) at 189.
23
Id.
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men and women while ignoring the fact that only women are affected by pregnancy. 24
Fighting discrimination must not only be concerned with direct and indirect
discriminatory rules, but also to adopt the required measures to reach the aimed result on
the ground.
However, fighting discrimination is not an easy matter. Even though the rules that aim at
eliminating discrimination might be decisive as to its wording, siuch as that adopted by
the current Egyptian constitution, many constraints and limitations might be imposed
over its effectiveness. If we take the anti-discrimination law of the UK as an example, we
find that the law itself provides comprehensive protection against discrimination that
goes far beyond the requirement of the European Union anti-discrimination law.25
However, two major restrictions are imposed over its capacity. The first one are the
“exceptions” whereby some cases are excluded from its application.26 The second are the
“justifications” whereby the discriminatory behavior is justified.27 This is similar to most
of the Egyptian laws where certain equalities are disregarded in the laws. Even those laws
are keen on applying equality, they face many obstacles as to their application. This is
due to various factors such as the interpretation of the court and the application
undertaken by the executive authority. These discriminatory flaws, whether in law or
application, are usually the result of a tension between the tendency towards a restrictive
application of anti-discriminatory measures, and the pragmatic approach where other
competing variables are weighed against the equality principle.28
In this regard, gender discrimination29 is one of the major types of discrimination that
international instruments and municipal laws tend to fight. Many of these forms of
discrimination are justified based on the stereotyping of both women and the role they

24

Larry Willmore, Discrimination, Extract from the Report on the World Social Situation, Chapter VIII,
(1997) at 4.
25
See N. Bamforth, M. Malik and C. O'Cinneide, Discrimination Law: Theory and Context, London: Sweet
& Maxwell (2008), at 299-309. In addition, we can see that certain types of discrimination are permitted in
the Equality Act of 2010 like marital status outside of employment. See sections 28 and 32 of the British
Equality Act 2010.
26
Colm O'Cinneide & Kimberly Liu, Defining the Limits of Discrimination Law in the United Kingdom:
Principle and Pragmatism in Tension, 15 INT'l J. Discrimination & L. 80 (2015), at 8.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
By gender discrimination, I refer to the biological or anatomical differences between men and women.
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play in society.30 The CEDAW adopted a broad definition of the discrimination against
women. It defines it as:
any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the
effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise
by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and
women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic,
social, cultural, civil or any other field.31
The definition adopted by the convention does not only address explicit discrimination,
but also indirect discrimination where identical treatment is applied if such treatment
constitutes impairing a women’s right.32 This can take place when a law appears neutral,
but imposes a discriminatory effect with its application. The CEDAW in its pursuit of
eliminating all forms of discrimination against women is keen on achieving gender
equality. It imposes on the states a formal legal obligation for achieving equality. 33 This
concept is concerned primarily with laws and their application. The convention also
requires states to undertake substantive measures to ensure gender equality. 34 Moreover,
the convention aims at ensuring the establishment of transformative equality through
addressing prevailing gender-based stereotypes.35
Governments in their efforts to address the discriminatory rules and behavior might not
only adopt the strict form of eliminating discrimination through strict interpretation of
equality before the law. Many governments, rather, prefer to adopt some preferential
policies, stipulated in the CEDAW, which promote equal opportunity rather than strict
equality for law.36 This is adopted by the Egyptian constitution which grants women
preferential treatment as to the number of seats preserved for women in the parliament.

30

Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex From
Gender, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 1-2 (1995) at 2.
31
Article 1 of Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,
A/RES/34/180 (1979).
32
General Recommendation 28, UN Doc CEDAW/C/GC/28, [16].
33
General Recommendation 25, UN Doc A/59/38, annex I [10].
34
The committee stipulated that it is not enough for states to guarantee equal treatment. States must take
into account biological, cultural and social differences in order to gurantee best results. CUSACK S,
PUSEY L. CEDAW and the Rights to Non-Discrimination and Equality. Melbourne Journal of
International Law (2013) at 64.
35
Id.
36
Larry Willmore, Discrimination, Extract from the Report on the World Social Situation 1997, Chapter
VIII ( 2001).
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The preferential policy, however, criticized for its aiming to solve the manifestation of
the37 discrimination, but not the inequality itself. Hence its existence must be only
temporary until equal opportunity is reached. Accordingly, discrimination has different
forms and eliminating its existence does require adopting multiple procedures and forms
of reparations.
B. The Constitution and Parliament Representation
In order to analyze the gender inequality in the Egyptian legal structure, we must first
analyze the articles of the consecutive constitutions. Since a constitution is considered to
be a social contract,38 assessment of its articles sheds light on the patriarchy in the legal
system in modern Egypt. There is a significant correlation between women’s rights
prescribed in the constitution, and how they are represented in the parliament which
suggest the existence of gender equality. For this reason, an assessment of women’s
rights must be made in order to identify the discrimination existing in the current system.
This can be achieved through assessing three pillars. The first one is the formation of the
constituent assembly of the constitution and the number of women represented in it. The
second assesses the wording of the constitution itself and, lastly, the level of
discrimination in social, political and cultural rights based on gender. Accordingly, we
must evaluate how these pillars have developed in Egyptian constitutions.
After the 1919 revolution, the formation of the constituent assembly which formed the
1923 constitution had a significant influence on the articles of the constitution. Prime
Minister Adli Pasha issued a decree to form the thirty-member legislative committee
which did not include any women. This constitution ignored the right of representation of
women in the parliament. While it recognized that Egyptians are equal before the law in
enjoying civil and political rights, the electoral law gave voting rights exclusively to men.
Though this constitution stated that discrimination based on origin, language, and religion
was forbidden, it ignored discrimination based on gender.39 In addition, under this
37

Id.
Starting from the 1952 the constitution was considered as a social contract unlike the 1923 constitution
which was considered as a grant from the King to the people; Hala Kamal Inserting women’s rights in the
Egyptian constitution: personal reflections, Journal for Cultural Research, 19:2, (2015) , at 155.
39
See Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 1923, art. 3.
38
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constitution, women were not given the right to vote.40 As a consequence, the protection
of women in this constitution was at its minimal which reflects the position of women
before the drafting of this constitution.41 The only right they acquired was the right of
primary school education.42 Hence, the constitution solidified the patriarchy in a legal
form that would enhance discrimination based on gender. Despite the important role that
women played in the strikes in 1919, the rights of women were disregarded.43 Here, since
patriarchal conservatism was no longer in need of women’s participation, they could go
back to their normal place in the home.44 This shows how patriarchal norms were
embodied in the behavior of the governing male elite.
After the 1952 revolution, a new constitution was issued in 1956 which slightly expanded
women’s rights. Unfortunately, in the same manner as its predecessor constitution, the
committee formed for drafting it was composed of fifty members none of whom were
women. Despite this, the constitution was more progressive than its predecessor. It stated
that all Egyptian are equal before the law without any discrimination based on sex.45 It
gave the right to all Egyptians to vote in accordance with the law. 46 Consequently,
women acquired the right to vote in the elections. It was the first constitution also to
mention the word “women” in the constitution.47 The constitution imposed over the State
the duty of reconciling their work in the community and duties in the family. This article,
which exists in all of the subsequent constitutions - 1971, 2012, and 2014 - explicitly
discriminating against women through depicting the main role of women as being within
the household, and their right to labor secondary to their family role. In addition,

40

Serena Tolino, Gender Equality in the Egyptian Constitution: From 1923 to 2014, Oriente Moderno 98
(2018) at 147.
41
Mohamed Al Agati, Women and Equal Citizenship: Analysis of the New Constitution of Egypt, (2012) at
11.
42
Id.
43
Selma, supra note 6 at 111.
44
see Margot Badran, Feminists, Islam, and nation: gender and the making of modern Egypt, Princeton
University Press (1995) at 74-88.
45
Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 1956, Art. 31.
46
Id, art. 61.
47
Id, art.19.
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criticism has been directed towards this article for separating women’s private rights as a
part of the family from her public rights as a citizen.48
The 1971 constitution, similarly, did not include any women within its formation. The
eighty members of the special committee who formed four sub-committees excluded
women from their composition. Apart from that, the 1971 constitution took further steps
towards equality. In addition to maintaining the stipulation of prevalence of equality, this
constitution for the first time stipulated a positive discrimination for women.

49

It

guaranteed the protection of motherhood and childhood, as well as guaranteed equality
with men in the political social, cultural and economic life but only as long as it did not
violate Islamic rules. 50 The correlation made between equality and the non-contradiction
with Islamic rules opened the door for a wide set of discriminatory laws that adopted
patriarchal ideologies. In addition, the constitution identifies citizenship by prescribing
that gender equality take place only in cases that it does not contradict Shari’a. This was
a major degradation towards the effort of gender equality and elimination of patriarchy.
This encouraged Islamists to advocate that women should fall back into their rightful
place in the home.51 In addition, in 1976, the constitution was amended to make the Islam
the principle source of legislation in Egypt. This was considered as a drawback for
women’s rights and opened the door for Islamists to set their restrictions. 52
Afterwards, during Mubarak’s rule, the constitution was amended twice - 2005 and
2007. The amendments were not directed towards addressing women’s rights.53
However, an important amendment was introduced in 2007 that permits law to provide a
minimum representation of women in the parliament.54 This opened the door for the
adoption of a quota system to appoint women in the Egyptian parliament. Hence, the
people assembly law was amended which gave women 64 seats out of 500 seats with a

48

Moussa, Jasmine. Competing Fundamentalisms and Egyptian Women's Family Rights : International
Law and the Reform of Shari'a-Derived Legislation, BRILL (2011) at 147.
49
Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, September 11, 1971, Art. 8, 40.
50
Id, art. 40.
51
Selma, supra note 10 at 80.
52
Supra note 49, Art. 2.
53
Serena Tolino, Gender Equality in the Egyptian Constitution: From 1923 to 2014, Oriente Moderno 98
(2018) at 154.
54
Supra note 49 Art. 62.
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percentage of about 12% of the total seats.55 Though this is considered a great step for
empowerment of women’s political rights, this limited number of seats, of only 12% of
the total, strengthened the patriarchy in the legal system and marginalized the role of
women in the society and political life since it does not reflect the real representation of
women in the society.
After the ouster of Mubarak during the events of 25th of January revolution, the
fundamental legal structure of the state was rebuilt. The 1971 constitution was suspended,
and since Islamists rose into power after Morsi became the president, the status of
women’s rights became vague. The constituent assembly was formed with 100
members.56 Among all these members only seven were women. Though women tried to
align with some non-Islamist political parties, the overall characteristic of women rights
prescribed for in the draft constitution was limited by their not contradicting the rules of
Shariah.

57

Article 68 of the draft constitution prescribed the equality between women

and men in all fields as long as it did not contradict with Shariah. This article was
removed eventually from the final draft as Salafis would not have allowed this article
without compliance with Shariah.58 Moreover, the Islamists managed to add article 219
which specified the scope of Shariah rules specifically. Of course, this implies a more
progressive interpretation of Shariah that was opposed by feminist activists. The
constitution also failed to guarantee protection against gender violence and human
trafficking. It also failed to stipulate the commitment of the country to international
treaties which includes the CEDAW.59 Moreover, this constitution did not treat women as
full citizens enjoying equal rights and responsibilities, but rather they were considered
either as “men fellows” or “mothers” in a way that they remained dependent on men.60 In
the People’s Assembly, only around 2% of women were represented as compared to the

55

Law no 149 of June 20, 2009 on Amending Some Rules of the Law no. 39 of 1972, art. 1.
Id.
57
Amany Abou El Fadl, . Min kawaleis al distour ser`al siyada al wataniyya wal irada al dawliyya
dakhel distour misr. Cairo: Nahdet Misr (2013).
58
Maya Morsy. Egyptian Women and the 25th January Revolution: Presence and Absence, Journal of
North African Studies (2014).
59
Amany, supra note 57.
60
Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, December 25, 2012, Preamble & art. 10.
56
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quota system adopted by Mubarak in 2010 of around 12% women representation.61 Even
then, those women were only involved in the discussion with a participation percentage
of 3% of the total.62 These women, in addition, did not promote women’s rights but
sometimes advocated for stabilizing the patriarchy.63
The 2014 constitution, on the other hand, was formed by a constitutional body of fifty
members;64 five of whom where women - a slightly higher percentage than that of the
2012 constitution.65 Despite this, the difference is dramatic. Most of them have a strong
record of defending women’s rights.66 A concrete reading of the current constitution will
deduce that many weaknesses in the former constitution were readdressed in this new
one, and even new points of gains were stipulated in it. The state guaranteed the
elimination of all sorts of violence and increased the empowerment of women to be
appointed in the top-leading positions without discrimination.

A reflection of the

implementation of these articles is seen in women members of the 2016 parliament of
14.9% which is the highest female representation in the parliament’s history.67
In 2019 the constitution was amended. One of the amendments adopted the quota system
again which stipulated that women’s seats must not be less than a quarter of the total
number of seats.

68

Whereas the percentage of women representation in the Egyptian

parliament was the highest in 2015 with almost 15% of seats,69 this percentage even
increased significantly in 2020 to a quarter of all of the seats.70 Despite this, the quota
system, as the one adopted before, does not grant women the equal amount of seats that is
61

Blanka Rogowska, Did Egyptian Women Win or Lose by Overthrowing the Regime of Hosni Mubarak?
(2018) at 116.
62
El Baradei, L. and Wafa, D., Women in the Second Egyptian Parliament Post the Arab Spring: Do They
Think They Stand a Chance?, “Journal of International Women’s Studies,” no. 14.3 (2013), at 42–63.
63
One of the women elected members called for cancelling Khulu law, and banning travel of women alone.
See Id.
64
Khalil Ashraf. “Egypt’s Committee of 50 Rewrites the Constitution – Again”. Al-Jazeera
America, (2013, In: https://goo.gl/48KfZ3
65
Prior to the formation of the 50 members committee, there was a 10 members committee that was
competent of revising the 2012 constitution. This 10 members committee did not include in its formation
any women representative.
66
Mariz Tadros, Negotiating Women in Egypt's Post-Mubarak Constitutions 2012–2014, (2020).
67
Hend El-Behary, “Women's Representation in New Parliament Highest in Egypt's History.” Egypt's
Independent (2014).
68
Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, January 18, 2014, art. 102.
69
Hala Abdelgawad and Mazen Hassan, Women in the Egyptian parliament: a different agenda, Review of
Economics and Political Science (2019), at 1.
70
Reem Leila, Egypt's parliament: A significant female representation, Ahramonline (2020).
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equivalent to their representation in the society. It has only increased the percentage
which does not yet represent the required number of seats that should be occupied by
women. Thus, even though consecutive constitutions increased the percentage of
women’s representations in the Egyptian parliament, it has implicitly empowered the
patriarchy.
In addition, if we look at the constituting committee, we see that despite women’s long
struggle for acquiring their rights and protesting, neither of the constituting committees of
the 1923 constitution, nor the 2012 one included any women in its formation. Though
things changed in the current constitution, only five women were part of the fifty member
committee responsible for drafting the 2014 constitution.
C. The Penal Law
The spread of violence against women is one of the major indications of patriarchy in
society. Women have long being subjected to violence worldwide.71 This behavior has
been widespread in Egypt also for a long time. In a survey held by the National Center
for Women, it is estimated that around 63% of married women have been subject to
violence through their life.72 Despite the effort exerted in the legal structure level to put
an end to this violence, the Egyptian Penal code has long opened the door for legitimating
violence against women. Article 60 of the Penal Code states that the law will not be
applied in a case where the act is undertaken with good intention in accordance with a
right stipulated in Shari’a law.73 This article has been frequently used by the criminal
courts and confirmed by the Court of Cassation in order to justify limited strikes by
family members against women in order to discipline them.74 The Court of Cassation, in
one of the cases where a daughter was killed due to being brutally beaten by her father,
declared that the right of discipline is permitted under article 60 of the penal code as long
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as the father hit them with leniency and in body parts other than face, head, and limbs.75
When the male family member uses extensive power to discipline his wife or daughter,
the court uses this article to ease the penalty imposed upon him.76
One of the major forms of gender discrimination that also exists in the Penal code is its
treatment of honor crimes. Despite the penal code not referring explicitly to honor crimes
in its wording, both articles 17 and 237 facilitate discriminatory behavior from the law in
honor cases.77 Article 17 gives courts the power to impose lenient sanctions on the
accused person in accordance with the circumstances of the crime.78 This article is
commonly applied by the court in order to promote lenience in crimes of honor in cases
where the conditions required in article 237 do not exist. The problem is that the court of
cassation stipulates that judges can apply leniency measures upon the existence of certain
circumstances without the need for a discussion of his reasoning in the ruling.79 This will
even extend the justification to apply this discriminatory article. The non-justified
discriminatory behavior can be established in a case where two brothers killed their third
brother’s wife for her bad reputation.80 They killed her and then burnt her body. The
court decreased the sentence from execution to life imprisonment by applying article 17.
This application shows how this article is discriminating against women’s rights. On the
other hand, article 237 stipulated explicitly that if a husband caught his wife in an
adulterous situation, and killed her and her partner at once, he would be convicted of a
misdemeanor only.81 This is an implicit permission from the law for husbands to execute
women if they commit adultery as they will be able to escape sanctions under the rule of
article 237, or have lenience if committing a crime of honor under article 237.
Another ground of gender discrimination relates to the crime of adultery for married
spouses. The penal law discriminates between married men and women in cases of
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adultery. The law sanctions married women who commit adultery with a period of two
years imprisonment.82 On the contrary, the law requires more restrictions in case of a man
who commits adultery; it requires that the adulterous action must be in the same house as
the marriage home, and in this case he will only be sanctioned with six months
imprisonment.83 In addition, the law gives the right of the husband of the adulterous wife
to stop the execution of this judgment and does not give a similar right to the women in
the same situation as men. The legislator in article 276 also stipulates certain restricted
grounds of evidence

84

in order to acknowledge the existence of adultery from the

married men’s side, leaving women’s adulterous action to be proven by all means without
any restrictions.85 This facilitates the proof of the crime committed by women while
complicates the proof of the commission of the crime from the men’s side. Accordingly,
in a new precedent, the appeal court of Banha referred these articles to the Supreme
Constitutional Court to review their constitutionality.86 The court in its reasoning
stipulated that there is not any justification for the unequal sanctions imposed on married
men and women in case of adultery since the crime is not acceptable from both on the
same level. It stated also that the law permitted married men to commit adultery in any
location as long as it is not in the house of marriage which is a discriminatory clause that
has not any justification.

87

The court also raised the point of discrimination on the

grounds of evidence between the two genders who commit the same crime.
D. Personal Status Law
One of the major controversial laws that is often raised when discussing the gender
equality topic is personal status law. Despite the fact that family law is supposed to be
included in the civil code and be regulated as a secular law,88 it now is comprised of a
significant number of gender discriminatory articles. Since personal status law is based
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on Shari’a law,89 it is considered to be one of the most important legal confrontations
between feminism and Islamism. Most of the gender inequality existing in the personal
status law revolves around rights during marriage and after divorce.
The personal status law distinguishes between the role of both men and women as to
maintenance. It puts the burden of maintaining the family and wife as part of the
husband’s duties.90 This financial privilege given to women is not a favor. It results in a
hierarchy in the marital relationship where women are supposed to obey their husbands’
orders.91 The law stipulates that a woman will not receive her maintenance if she
disobeys her husband, and she will be considered disobedient if she refuses to come back
after he invites her back home known as bayt al- ta’ah.92 This article highlights the
patriarchal constitution of family under personal status law.93 In addition, she will lose
her maintenance if she commits apostasy, or leaves the matrimonial house without her
husband’s permission.94 Another significant inequality is that the law also stipulates that
a woman loses maintenance if she works in a manner that affects the interest of the
family after her husband explicitly asks her to stop.95 This amplifies the ideology of the
law which considers women as subordinant to men in martial relations whereby men
have symbolic control over many fundamental rights that constitute women’s identity as
an equal citizen.
Under personal status law, polygamy is permissible in a way that promotes male
supremacy.96 The only limitation existing on the absolute right given to men is to inform
the wife that he is going to marry a new one. Thus, Egyptian men can marry more than
one woman at the same time and women might not be able to plead divorce for harm. In
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the annulled law that was issued in 1979,97 women were given the right to get a divorce
directly when their husbands married another woman.98 Even though this was still
discriminating against women, as polygamy was only permitted for men, this restriction
was not included in the latter amendment of the law which constitutes a severe form of
patriarchal discrimination. Permitting polygamy explicitly contradicts with Egyp’st
responsibilities derived from the CEDAW Convention.99
The personal status law also is not equating between men and women as to maintenance,
custody and guardianship on children. Though law is favoring women in the maintenance
and custody parts, it gives the guardianship rights to men.100 Putting the burden of
maintenance on men might seem to be privileging women, however, in reality it
strengthens the stereotype of women being a householder while men are the laborers;
women should do their work as a caregiver for their children ‘hold custody’ while men
should pay the expenses ‘maintenance’.101 This same ideology gave men the right of
guardianship over children even if the women have their custody until age twenty one. 102
This discrimination was slightly limited when the child law was amended to give the one
who has the custody the power to exercise guardianship over education.103 This
amendment aimed at decreasing the effects of the patriarchal composition of the
guardianship. The law is not even considering a mother capable of being a guardian in
case the father was incapable of exercising his rights, rather, it gives the guardianship to
the grandfather.104
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Apart from that, dissolution of marriage in the personal status law also discriminates
against women. Even though the legislator intervened to insert a solution for women, 105 it
was not enough to overcome the existence of inequality. The law primarily granted men
the power of divorce without the need to state any reason or file a lawsuit. On the
contrary, women who seek divorce must prove the existence of one of the conditions
stipulated by the law. Grounds for seeking divorce by the wife can be due to extended
absence of the husband,106 polygamy,107 and the existence of harm. This shows how
women’s rights were violated concerning the dissolution of the marriage contract.
As stipulated before, one of the major grounds for divorce is to prove that there is harm
inflicted upon the wife.108 However, it is the responsibility of the wife to prove the
existence of such harm. If we look closer at the harm requirement for divorce, we will
find many difficulties revolving around it. Harm interpretation falls in the hands of judges
where they have full discretionary power. In addition, the burden of proof falls on the
wife. Judges are also restricted by other judicial precedents that have been proven to be
conservative.109 One of these precedents is that when a wife return back home after being
subject to harm, the court should not implicate divorce since life could be resumed
between spouses.110 Another problem is that standards of harm are not stable. A court
can make exceptions to harm based on the social standard of the wife.111 In one of the
cases, the Court of Cassation defined harm that could be relied on for divorce as being
the one that can be done through either words or physical acts that are considered harmful
by custom in a way that the wife cannot bear it anymore. 112 This shows how much the
judge enjoys discretionary powers in deciding whether to grant divorce based on harm. In
addition, the wife still needs the testimony of two witnesses that have seen the act
105
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undertaken by the husband.113 Harm is even harder to prove in cases of polygamy though
polygamy resembles a clear example of discrimination. In addition, it is considered a
lengthy and costly procedure for women to get a divorce through a court judgment.114
The law no 1 of year 2000 aimed at easing the discrimination existing in the divorce
regulation. It gave women the right to break off the marriage bond unilaterally or khul’ in
return for abdicating their financial rights.115 This way of separation still required that
women go to court in order to separate=. Whereas, it is not required to justify her request
through stating the reasons of khul’ as the judge does not have a discretionary power over
it.116 This solution is criticized as women still have to appoint lawyers and go to court
which can be exhausting. In addition, the duration though considered shorter than
divorce, can still take quite a few months before the judge renders his decision.117
Moreover, a women is forced to return the dowry that was given to her at marriage in
addition to abdicating her financial rights which can be financially exhausting especially
for those who are unemployed.118 Hence, it is discriminatory to impose all of these
obstacles on women, while giving men the power of unilateral repudiation through going
to a civil state office and without the need for justifications.
E. Nationality Law
The nationality law is not separate from the discriminatory legal nature of Egyptian laws.
The nationality law, unlike other laws like the personal status law and penal code, has
many consecutive versions during the past century. This active legal reformation that
characterizes the history of the Egyptian nationality law all discriminate against women.
Although each of them was issued during a different political moment, all of them have
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agreed to ignore women’s rights. Accordingly, in this part the development of the
nationality law until the adoption of the current law is discussed.
After Egypt became independent from the Ottoman Empire, it was important to establish
a new nationality law that would empower the state to give nationality to its citizens.
Accordingly, the nationality law no. 26 of the year 1926 was issued. 119 This law did not
last long and a new law replaced it, no. 19 of the year 1929. This law recognized
Egyptians as people who are born form an Egyptian father whether inside or outside the
state. It is clear, accordingly, that this law did not equate men’s status with women’s in
passing the nationality to their children. The legislator only granted the children of an
Egyptian woman her nationality in cases where the father was not known.120 In other
words, the law granted Egyptian nationality to children of an Egyptian woman as long as
the lineage to the father could not be legally proven. 121This is considered good coverage
for these children by the nationality law in order not to have stateless children.
In addition, the law granted the foreign wife that was married to an Egyptian the right to
acquire the nationality, based on certain requirements specified in the law, though it did
not grant this right to the foreign husband who was married to an Egyptian wife. 122 In the
same context, if a male foreigner acquired the Egyptian nationality, for one of the reasons
of naturalization prescribed in the law, his wife would be granted the Egyptian nationality
based on the fulfillment of certain requirements.123 However, the legislators again kept
silent on the opposite case when the foreigner is a woman. Thus, in this case the husband
of this foreign woman, who had acquired the Egyptian nationality, would not be able to
acquire the Egyptian nationality. The legislator continued his discriminatory path as he
granted the children of the male foreigner Egyptian nationality once their father acquired
the Egyptian nationality.124 There is no similar article for foreign women.
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Later on, prior to the 1952 revolution, a new nationality law was issued. The nationality
law no 160 of the year 1950 expanded the conferring the Egyptian nationality to children
of Egyptian women. Article 3 of this law stated that to be considered Egyptian, it
includes whomever is born outside of the Egyptian territory by an Egyptian woman
whose lineage to his father was not proven. It is clear that the wording used by the
Egyptian legislator was very decisive as to grant them the Egyptian nationality without
any discretionary power by the administrative authorities. Thus, he considered this
nationality was granted through blood bond not by naturalization. This is considered a
positive step forward towards granting Egyptian nationality to children brought from an
outside marriage relationship where their fathers refused to acknowledge their paternity,
and their Egyptian mother failed to prove this through the courts.
The 1950 nationality law did not last long. In conjunction with the principles of the 1952
revolution, a new law for nationality was issued, no. 391 of the year 1956,125 in order to
coincide with other social and economic developments.126 This new law maintained the
previous expansion,127 however, the wording of the article as well as its subjective
content changed dramatically. In the new law, article 3 gave the administrative authority
discretionary power for granting nationality to the children of an Egyptian woman where
the lineage to the father was not proven and when born outside Egyptian territory. It also
added a new condition that should be fulfilled. It required that this child should have
spent at least five continuous years in Egypt before reaching the age of majority. This of
course is considered a major restriction that did not exist in the previous nationality laws.
Thus, the legislator considered that grounds for granting nationality is naturalization not
the blood bond. Besides promoting ongoing inequality against women, he also withdrew
some of the rights that had already been given her from previous laws. In the same
context, other inequalities that existed in its previous nationality laws were prescribed
again without changes. This law did not last long due to the unity between Egypt and
Syria during Nasser’s rule. A new law was issued, no. 82 of the year 1958,128 to regulate
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the new legal status of nationality of Egyptian and Syrian citizens. However, this law did
not state anything new regarding women’s nationality rights.
Egypt continued to rely on the law issued during the United Arab Republic between
Egypt and Syria even after the dissolution of this unity in 1961. Thus, there was an
existing need to change this law which actually happened in 1975 with law no. 26.129
This law did not address the inequalities that existed in the previously mentioned laws.
However, it put the position of children of women that were born outside of the territory
where lineage to the father could not be proven in a better position. The legislator
acknowledged again that he would grant nationality to these children based on the blood
bond not naturalization. Thus, it stated that these children are considered Egyptians
without giving any discretionary power to the administrative authority. However, the
legislator did not remove the requirement of making his normal accommodation in Egypt
prior to reaching the majority age. This was a constructive step taken by the Egyptian
legislator. However, the predominant characteristic of the nationality law which
depended on the Egyptian male as the ultimate source of Egyptian nationality continued
to exist.
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III.

A Closer Look at the Egyptian Nationality Law

Since a correlation has long existed between a patriarchal legal structure and gender
inequality in nationality laws, the latter has continued to reflect the patriarchy through all
of its subsequent promulgations. Many progressive changes have been undertaken both to
the legal system in general and to nationality laws more specifically. However, the rights
given to women are still too far from the point of equality. Abiding by the patriarchal
ideology of women being subordinate to men, the legal identity of woman as an Egyptian
citizen has long been attributed to another male. This has been translated in successive
Egyptian nationality laws that reflect the social conceptualization of women in the
Egyptian community. Accordingly, Egyptian nationality law extended the nationality to
women only through a male figure: either passed through Egyptian fathers or through
Egyptian husbands. This irrational discrimination was the result of a long precipitation of
gender discrimination characterizing the legal system. Hence, the nationality law was
amended in 2004 in order to address this problem.
In this chapter, I will talk about the debate that surrounding the adoption of the
amendment of the law of nationality. I will discuss Egypt’s reservations to the CEDAW
Convention, and how this reflected the patriarchal ideology of the legislature while
enacting the nationality law no 26 of 1975. Also I will highlight the grounds that were
raised for and against the enactment of the amendment no 154 of 2004. Following, I will
discuss the legal nature of acquiring nationality according to the Egyptian nationality law
which infused a huge degree of discrimination in the new amendment. Finally, I will
assess the amendment law as a tool used for social reform in the nationality law in Egypt.
A. The Debate Over the 2004 Amendment
Before the promulgation of the law no. 154 of 2004, the Egyptian nationality law no. 26
of 1975 discriminated against women in many aspects. The most dominant inequality
appears in the deprivation of the children of Egyptian women whom married to a foreign
person from acquiring the nationality of their mother. It is estimated that by 2004 around
298,000 children have been deprived of the Egyptian nationality because they were born
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to Egyptian mother whom has been married to a foreign person.130 Some of these
children were raised in Egypt for many years, even spent their whole life there, while
facing economic, social and psychological difficulties in the community.
The aim of the legislator from this situation could be understood when we have a look
over the reservations made by Egypt on the Convention of Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women. Egypt has been one of the first Arab countries to sign the
Convention which is considered as one of the major tools for protection of women’s
right.131 However, since principles of Islamic Shari’h is prescribed in the constitution as
the source of legislation in the Egyptian constitution,132 Egypt made subjective
restrictions on the convention. In this essence, Egypt made four subjective reservations
on the convention related to article 2,9,16 and 29 paragraph 1.
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However, what is

relevant to our study in this paper are the reservations made by Egypt for article 2 and 9.
Article 2 of the convention is a general clause that prescribes that states which are parties
to the treaty should amend their laws in order to be consistent with the convention. Egypt
made a reservation on this article in which it will comply with its content “provided that
such compliance does not run counter to the Islamic Shari’a”.134 Thus, Egypt agreed to
comply with the convention as long as it will not contradict with Shari’a principles;
otherwise it will not apply the convention. This is a significant restriction on the
effectiveness of the convention. Putting a reservation on this article means excluding the
main tools that could be used to achieve the goals of the convention.135 Therefore, it
violates the integrity of the convention and does not serve in favor of its universal
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application.136 Accordingly, though Egypt did not make a reservation on all of the articles
of the convention, this reservation exempt Egypt from abiding with any obligation in the
whole convention that contradicts with Islamic law.
Relying on Islamic Shari’a as a sanctuary in order to justify the actions of the state
cannot be justified. Islam cannot be considered as a ground for gender discrimination.
Those who adopt the patriarchal ideology utilize its rules and interpret it in a way that
would serve their interests. In addition, if we look deeper into Shair’a law we will find
that Quran and Sunnah have been its formal sources.137 Relying on these sources, and
with the use of hadith138, ijtihad139, and ijma140, a workable law could be formed. By the
end of the ninth century, Shariah law was completely formed and the door of ijtihad was
closed.141 This slowly turned Shari’a into a rigid set of rules which is completely
opposite to the concept of gradualism adopted in early days of Islam.142 Even the reform
achieved over years was based on selective employment and biased interpretation of
Quran versus.143 Accordingly, closing the door of ijtihad and relying on the process of
“picking and choosing in order to choose the rules of Shari’a lead to the deviation of the
use of Shari’a as a reference in law. Hence, Shari’a must not be framed as divine as it is
made by jurists even if they were interpreting Quran and Sunna. A clear example for this
dilemma is the disregard made by the patriarchal interpreters of Quran in which they
highlighted the Quran versus which stated that male and female were created from the
same nafs.144 They intentionally ignore this versus on the expense of the misinterpreted
principle that men are ‘qawamun’ over women. This term has long been interpreted that
men are superior over women which paved the rood for legitimizing a patriarchal model.
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In fact, this term mean protection and support from men to women,145 but patriarchal
interpreters preferred the other meaning.
On the same context, Egypt also made a reservation on article 9 which states that women
shall be granted equal right as men with respect to their children’s nationality.146 The
problem is that Egypt reservation on article 9 of the convention hinders its application.
Egypt justified its reservation based on:
To prevent a child's acquisition of two nationalities where his parents are of
different nationalities, since this may be prejudicial to his future. It is clear that
the child's acquisition of his father's nationality is the procedure most suitable for
the child and that this does not infringe upon the principle of equality between
men and women, since it is the custom for a woman to agree, on marrying an
alien, that her children shall be of the father's nationality.147
This reservation is clearly discriminating against women without any convincing
justification. Egypt stated that ‘it is clear’ that having the father’s nationality is more
suitable for the child with an arbitrary decision against women. Accordingly, this
reservation failed to introduce any acceptable justification for stripping women of this
fundamental right stated in this article.
The concept adopted by the government and the legislator was justified based on some
grounds that were also criticized by others. The first ground is that parents are the one
competent of raising patriotism and nationalism awareness in their children. This is
strengthened by the fact that father is the controller of the household.148 Hence, he has the
capabilities to articulate children’s way of thinking. On the other hand, those who support
the right of Egyptian mother consider this ground as point of strength for women not the
opposite. Women are the one who educate and raise her children to be loyal for the
country which might overweight the role of men in this essence.149
In addition, the Egyptian nationality law is considered repellent to nationality not an
attracting one. This is due to the massive annual increase in the population. Therefore,
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giving the mother the power to pass her nationality will be inconsistent with the
methodology of the Egyptian legislator.

150

This ground was criticized since controlling

the over-population problem must not be enforced through depriving children of the
Egyptian mother from their right to acquire the nationality, but through other known
methods adopted to fight this problem.151
Lastly, they relied on the elimination of the dual nationality problem as a solid ground for
this discrimination, and even this was stated in the reservation made by Egypt on the
CEDAW. They justified it on the basis that giving the nationality to children of the
Egyptian mother will lead to a dual-nationality situation if the nationality law of the
father gives him the right to pass his nationality in all cases.152 This ground was turned
over by the fact that the consecutive nationality laws have many cases were dualnationality cases could arise. For example, the law gives the right of acquiring nationality
to children who have an Egyptian origin though they have acquired a foreign
nationality.153 In addition, the Egyptian nationality law permitted explicitly in article 10
paragraph 3 the right of the foreigner who acquired the Egyptian nationality to maintain
his foreign nationality.
Thus, many governmental and non-governmental organizations highlighted this problem
and initiated a campaign to withdraw Egypt reservations made on the CEDAW 154 and to
correct this situation in law no. 26 of 1975.

155

This drove the Former President Mubarak

to announce in the annual conference of the governing party in 2003 that the nationality
law will be amended.156 Shortly afterwards, the law no. 154 of 2004 has been enacted
and published on July, 2004. This has been considered as one of the most progressive
achievement for women as to her nationality rights.
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B. Nature of Nationality Acquisition
In order to assess the gender equality achieved under the law no. 154 of 2004 amendment
of the Egyptian nationality law, we must first understand the legal and social significance
of nationality. Generally speaking, nationality is a legal bond that attaches people to their
state. Nationality has acquired its importance from the fact that it formulates the core of
the state. In other words, it defines the formation of population. It is considered as one of
the most important Human Rights in modern history. The Universal Declaration for
Human Rights

157

declared that nationality is a right to everyone, and no one shall be

arbitrarily deprived of it nor denied the right to change it
We can deduce that nationality stands on 3 main pillars. The first pillar is the existence of
the state that has the power to create and grant the nationality. In addition, individuals are
the second pillar that would be granted the nationality and, hence, form the society. The
last and most important condition is the legal bond between the state and the individual.
Obviously, the clearest disclosure of this relation is the nationality municipal laws.158
Thus, the significance of nationality rules is manifested through its effects. These laws
grant individuals the capacity of being citizen in the state. It, subsequently, empowers
him directly to exercise many rights like political and social rights, right of education and
health care.159
From the international law perspective, nationality, as one of the human rights, was
considered primitive and not developed.

160

Though nationality is very important on the

International level, the most crucial consequence for its existence remains internal. 161 It is
settled that states have the full discretionary power in regulating nationality laws
according to their own interest.162 the Permanent Court of International Justice, followed
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by the International Court of Justice,163 held that, in the present state of international law,
questions of nationality are [. . .] in principle within [each State’s] reserved domain’ in
the absence of any ‘obligations which it may have undertaken towards other States’.164
Thus, only this internal correlation can constitutes the rights and duties of persons.
It is important in this regard to differentiate between nationality and citizenship. It could
be defined as the status of a natural person who is attached to a State by the tie of
allegiance. Nationality could be referred to as one of the synonym for citizen or subject,
but usually used in a broader aspect. It only refers to the tie between the individual and
the state without any reference to the rights and duties constituted from this tie. For Kunz,
nationality is a matter of international law, while citizenship is related to municipal
law.165 Accordingly, nationality refers to the population of the state which should be
defended in relation with other states, while citizenship refers to the civil and political
rights and duties granted and protected by the state166, whereas, most scholar use a
divergent meaning to refer to nationality and citizenship. Dumbrava, for example, defined
citizenship as political membership and nationality as legal membership.167 This was
strengthened by the definition made by the European Convention on Nationality which
stated that nationality is ‘the legal bond between a person and a state and […] not […] the
person’s ethnic origin’.168 Looking closer into the historic formation of citizenship, we
will find that ethnicity and nationalism have always been attributed to the basis of
citizenship. It was common in the past to include or exclude citizens based on their
ethnicity and nationalism. However, these grounds for forming citizenship policies have
decreased significantly especially in the west.169 Though these many crucial rules of
modern citizenship laws were connected to ethnic concepts, gradually, these grounds
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were replaced by new principles of acquiring nationality that are considered extensions of
these fundamental grounds of citizenship.
Globally, nowadays, the most dominant way of acquiring citizenship is either by blood
“ius sanguinis” as child takes the nationality of his father. It could be also acquired by
birth “ius soli” which take place when a person is born in a specific territory, and thus
gains its nationality. Lastly, an individual could acquire the nationality of a state through
naturalization in which he could apply for it after a while from his birth on meeting
certain criteria set by the given state.170 The Egyptian nationality law, same as most of
other countries, adopted the 3 doctrines as grounds for acquiring the Egyptian nationality.
Egypt relies primarily on ius sanguinis and naturalization as main grounds for acquiring
citizenship.171 Only in limited cases ius soli could be applied for granting nationality.
Precisely, the most dominant way of acquiring citizenship, globaly, is ius sanguinis
which refers to birthright citizenship which could take place descending from a citizen
and jus soli which refers to being born in the country. The former ground for acquisition
of citizenship worldwide is very complex. This ground of acquisition, though being
defended on some grounds,172 has been criticized for being arbitrary in regard to the
details of birth and unequally assigning legal status.173 In addition, there is general
consensus that citizenship should be formed based on the judgment on the Nottebohm
case in which it is considered a link between the individual and the state. 174 There is also
an agreement that long-term residence in a state empower the right to obtain the
nationality.175 However, combining those two concepts will not be compatible with the
external ius sangunis where children are born abroad for non-resident citizens. There
170
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children do not have a direct link with the state itself. This external ius sanguinis is quite
popular all over the world. 176
However, though, ius sanguinis is considered the dominant method of obtaining
nationality, ius soli is considered the broadened and liberal way. Despite this, its
effectiveness might be massively limited due to the restrictions imposed upon it.

177

For

example, the German law stipulated that those who acquired nationality based on ius soli
must choose between the German nationality and any other nationality at the age of
majority.178 Thus, this discriminate between citizens as only those who acquire
nationality based on ius soli are forced to choose one nationality.

179

Thus, it is clear that

both grounds of granting nationality based on birthright are criticized.
This inconsistency has led to non-uniform set of rules governing nationality. The problem
arises from the fact that in many countries there is a distinction between rights and
privileges of citizens who acquired the nationality based on how they acquired it. This
violation of citizenship equality finds its place through the distinction between citizens by
birth, naturalization, or other ways.180 We can see that in countries like Portugal, Spain
and Bulgaria the naturalized citizens are deprived from the right of holding some high
ranked positions.181 Hence, we can deduce how much the current rules of nationality are
making inequalities and deformed citizenship.
Similarly, the Egyptian nationality law has adopted these unequal ways of acquiring
nationality which resulted in different rights and duties for Egyptian citizens. Ius soli
was only adopted in one situation where a child is born in Egypt while not knowing his
parents.182 On the other hand, the dominant way of acquiring nationality is the ius
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sanguinis.183 The law also opened the door for many grounds for naturalization and set its
conditions with a wide discretion power to the administrative authority. Precisely, the law
did not only rely on the blood bond as a dominant method of Egyptian nationality
acquisition. Rather, it adopted the historical patriarchal perspective in which citizenship
is acquired through a male family member.184 Thus, in addition to the aforementioned
inequality between citizens based on the method of acquisition of citizenship, the
Egyptian legislator made a new inequality based on the gender aspect. As we have seen
before, the nationality law before the last amendment has not given the Egyptian women
the right to pass nationality whether based on ius sanguinis or through naturalization.
After the amendment, the women are divided; some of them can pass nationality based
on ius sanguinis and others based on naturalization in an explicit unjustified patriarchal
differentiation. Hence, nature of acquisition of nationality does not only discriminate
between equal Egyptian citizens, but also used by the Egyptian legislator to differentiate
between the genders.
C. Amendment of Nationality Law no 154 of 2004 As a Way of Social Reform
Nationality law amendment no. 154 of 2004 was a result of an imminent social change in
which law was used as a tool for its achievement. This Social change could be defined as
a variation in the stable behavior in the society.185 It is a change in the way people
communicate and behaves not in the standards of the community.
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When there is a

social problem in the society, social change could take place through consciously
defining the problem and solving it through using rationale tools.187 One of the most
important tools for undertaking this social change is the use of law. Accordingly, due to
the apparent mobilization made by feminist civil movements, the gender inequality in
nationality law was identified and law was used by the Egyptian government as a tool to
alter this deficiency.
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However, there are different opinions on whether law is considered as an efficient tool
for social change or not. Some literature believes that the development of law is slower
than the dynamic changes of societies. So it is usually running after these social changes
aiming to cope with it gradually.

188

On the other hand, Law might be seen as not only a

reflection of the current social order but as an imminent player in cases of changing the
current situation. The law is both a mirror of the society’s progress and a cause of its
change.

189

Law is always utilized as a tool of legitimizing the development of social

changes, whereas law in modern societies has been used as an important tool for social
change.190 Some other people highlighted the unanticipated results of the reform role of
law which might cause a negative effect on social reform.191 However, Carolyn Heilbum
once said that conservatives always anticipate a disaster when they think about social
changes, whereas revolutionaries except utopia; both of them are wrong.192
However, law as a tool of social change in gender equality in Egypt has proved its failure
to achieve its ultimate goal. Relying on law as a source of social reform, though might
seem to be beneficial in undertaking a tangible change, is ignoring the ideological power
of law as a mechanism of altering the real character of social identity and blocking the
core of social change. 193 Adopting new laws as a mean of social reform is only covering
up the deep anger and dissatisfaction existing among society members. It is only putting a
mask over the real social problem without solving its roots.194 These laws will typically
lead to a flow of law cases that are trying to alter these deficient laws. Many civil society
organization and activist, consequently adopt the strategic litigation as a method that
might minimize the effects of this failure.
Despite the fact that law is responsive for social change and legal reform, there is an
apparent gap between the ideal goals of equality and the substantive applied rules. Law as
188
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a regulatory tool could be used as a suppressive factor used by male authority. This lies
down in the ideology of law that forms social cohesion and stability. The power of law
appears in its ideology to shape social order in the name of traditions.195 This ideology is
powerful to the extent that law and custom are integrated in a way that is hard to
differentiate them. For example, in the 1908, the United States Supreme Court set
working hours limits for women due to their physical structure and justified this to
protect her from greed of men.196 Hence, in the name of protection women, the
patriarchal conception of hierarchical classification was strengthened. This is exactly
what the amendment of the nationality law did through strengthening patriarchy in
nationality law. While it might appear solving the problem, it has legalized the gender
inequality.
Those who advocated for depending on law as the only ground for gender reform in
nationality law have faced the nature of law itself. Law as discourse is lying in between
reality and ideality. It is considered a reflection of social and political changes.197 In this
essence, law targeted achieving the idea of gender equality in nationality law, while on
the ground it was not able to achieve this goal since social order and legal structure in
Egypt as we have stipulated is patriarchal.
According to some scholars,198 law is considered a symbol and a tool for enforcing male
dominance. Men have created law and controlled its formation and enforcement in
modern societies.

199

Consequently, law, as a tool, adopts, exercise, and re-enact

patriarchy. All the law features of hierarchy, combating and rationality among others
constitute the core of a patriarchal institution.200 In which law became hard to change.
Rather, patriarchy is the one that should be changed.
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IV.

Strategic Litigation as a Tool of Social Reform In Nationality Law

Legal activists and civil society organizations sometimes rely on legal mobilization as a
means of advocating for their causes and for wanted legalizations. The most prominent
form of this means is the use of strategic litigation as a way of promoting social change
and endeavoring to change the law.201 The same path has been adopted by women
activists who are trying to promote gender equality. In this chapter, I will define the
meaning and grounds of strategic litigation. I will, then, give examples of how strategic
litigation has been used as a useful tool of reform in Egypt. Finally, I will show how
strategic litigation was able to tackle many gender inequalities in the Egyptian nationality
law.
A. Defining Strategic Litigation:
One of the paths used by social advocates to forward their plans for social change is by
using strategic litigation. Generally speaking, strategic litigation refers to as the cases of
general interest that will not only affect a party’s interests, but also the whole society.202
It is used in order to raise awareness of people regarding certain issues, and to urge the
government to comply with the social reform needs. It gives both activists and courts the
proper channel for democratic discussion.203 This mean of social change achieve its goals
when it wins the legal battles in courts. And even if they lose it, this gives the movement
time to develop other paths along with increasing the awareness of the public.204 Strategic
litigation, therefore, is considered as one of the critical tools of social reform.
Adopting this strategy requires the existence of four different conditions. First, it requires
the existence of a legal framework that preserves human rights such as a constitution that
adopts its principle, a legal structure, or the possibility of applying international human
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rights treaties.

205

In addition, the judicial system must enjoy independence without being

influenced by other state authorities.206 Thirdly, there must be a strong ground for civil
society organizations. Advocates must have a good knowledge of litigation and the role
of courts in social reform. They must also be able to cooperate with other groups to form
stronger grounds for a better outcome. Finally, litigation must be supported by other
channels that pushes forward towards social change such as social movements that
increase public awareness. This cannot be achieved without the existence of loyal funders
of the core of the case.
To evaluate whether social change can be initiated and presumed before courts we must
have an intensive look over those who bring the case into adjudication. Those who
participate in the legal change through litigation are usually considered a repeat player
(RP) which is often represented by a large entity rather than being one-shotters (OS).207
Having the advantage of frequently filing cases will enhance the intelligence and
expertise of litigation. Unlike OS, RPs aim not only at shortcomings but also at affecting
the decisionmakers in the next round whereas OS are only concerned with their personal
outcomes disregarding the future ones.

208

Hence, RPs tend to minimize possible gains at

the expense of being able to expand law-gains. In addition, RPs are the ones who have
the power to invest their resources in challenging a given law, and bear the consequences
of some symbolic losses at the expense of future gains.209
The problem with the nationality law cases is that the Government as a defendant is the
one who is playing the role of RP, while all of the nationality cases claimants are OS. The
reason is that nationality is generally considered a personal right. However, OS claimants
in nationality cases are privileged by having lawyers representing them that are
considered on their own as RPs.210 It is certain that specialized lawyer will supply the
claimant with better information and expertise related to their personal gains.
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Unfortunately, lawyers specialized in OS cases are mostly from a lower level of prestige
within profession and tend to work individually. 211 Thus, they fail to encourage and
mobilize claimants due to ethical rules of advocacy. 212
It is notable that movements of social advocates in the United States in the last decades
have brought cases of racism and other social reform needs into courts.

213

The reason is

that courts are progressively more active than the legislator who is considered rigid and
opposing change. Consequently, it is believed that courts play a crucial rule in law and
social change, especially the United Stated Supreme Court.214 However, we can see that
the effect of the court is only part of many legal reform tools in the country. Even in
cases like Brown v. Board of Education, the role of the Court in social reform were
extensively supported by huge protests and legislative regulations.215 The importance of
Courts role in reform comes from the power of emphasizing the need for change. Issues
of social reform are highlighted through filing cases in courts which are directed towards
affecting the legislator agendas and social public awareness regardless of whether they
win or lose the case in court.216 However, alternative paths can be adopted in order to
undertake this change. An example of this is obvious when activists turned away from the
Supreme Court and started placing pressure on the congress, domestic legislatures, state
and federal governments and even in federal courts.217
However, this can also be criticized on many grounds. Social reform, for some, is
considered beyond the courts scope of jurisdiction. The courts do not have the required
information and expertise related to the social reform cases in order to evaluate its cost-
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benefit equation.218 Settling long-term social deficiencies is not one of the functions of
courts; rather they are only competent of settling individual cases. Hence, courts might
undertake a social change without being aware of the consequence of their intervention
since they are only involved in a small part of the bigger image. 219 The reason is that they
are governed by some procedures and boundaries that might not limit their ability to
evaluate the whole context.
B. Strategic Litigation in Egypt
As we have previously noticed, the first requirement for strategic litigation to be effective
is the existence of legal framework that would respect human rights principles and aims
at its enforcement. If we have a look over the current constitution we will find that it has
been keen on protecting many women’s citizenship rights like full representation in the
legislative bodies, appointment in the high ranked position and appointment in judicial
bodies, but most importantly it states that the state must guarantee achieving equality
between women and men in all civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights in
accordance with the provisions of the constitution.220 Moreover, the constitution
considers any treaty related to human rights signed by the state have the power of law.221
Thus, the CEDAW convention, that requires signatory states to implement equal rights
between men and women in passing their nationality to children, impose a legal liability
over the government to amend its current laws to be consistent with its articles.
Meanwhile, the Egyptian government is pushing forward towards achieving gender
equality and women empowerment.222 Egypt adopted an agenda in order to cope with the
United Nation goals for Sustainable Development 2030. The fifth goal of this agenda is
to guarantee equal rights and opportunities between men and women. 223 Egypt also stated
that it aims to end all forms of discrimination against all women and girls everywhere.
218
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Latter, the Egyptian president endorsed the first-ever national strategy for the
Empowerment of Egyptian Women 2030.

224

It is consistent with Egypt vision 2030 on

Sustainable Development Strategy. This strategy stands on four pillars which are
women’s political empowerment and leadership; women’s economic empowerment;
women’s social empowerment; and women’s protection.225 This will be achieved through
reviewing current legislations and ensuring its conformity with equality and challenging
the cultural stereotype related to women in different sectors.226
If we look at the judicial structure in Egypt, we will see that since the establishment of
the Supreme Constitutional Court and Administrative courts, the courts was not in
affirmative line with the government’s interests. 227 Litigation become a fundamental tool
for social movements and activists for challenging government’s policies and laws which
is way easier method than challenging them in the People’s assembly. Hence, the
common interest of both courts and activists on defending human and civil rights, led to
the expansion of the use of courts as a mean of strategic litigation to undertake social
reform in Egypt for the last decades.228
In addition, we can see that many civil society organizations are active in Egypt.
Apparently, all of these variables have contributed for the existence of a convenient
environment for strategic litigation. Strategic litigation has long been demonstrated in
Egyptian courts whether directly through civil society organizations and activists or
indirectly through supporting individuals with same legal status to file cases. The cases
that are filled directly are usually related to public interest matters. The question arouse
around this cases is whether civil society organizations have the required legal
competence of filling this cases.
If we looked at public interest litigation “third party litigation” we will find that courts
are mostly behind its existence. In the U.S., the Supreme Court interpreted the meaning
224
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of the constitution regarding injury in which it stated that it should be concrete and
particularized.229 Hence, injury is the one that affects the claimant in an individual
manner. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, introduced the over-breadth challenges as an
exception for this which allows citizens to sue on behalf of part of the population. The
expansion adopted for permitting public interest litigation was based on the doctrine
adopted by court to widen its authority to protect rights. 230
Similar to the US constitution, the Egyptian litigation law stipulates that claimants must
acquire personal and direct interest in his claim. Otherwise, the claims should be
dismissed. 231 The Supreme Administrative Court, however, was able to widen the scope
of personal interest to be able to adjudicated public interest cases. The court in many
occasions refers to the fundamental principles of public rights and liberties stipulated in
the constitution in order to justify public interest litigation.

232

It stated that restricting

acceptance of cases on the condition of existence direct and personal interest of the
claimant in matters that are trespassing the fundamental rights is conflicting with the
nature of the administrative cases. Some of the public rights that were relied on by the
Supreme Administrative Court to widen the scope of Strategic litigation are cases related
to protection of public property,233 right of development and exploitation of natural
resources.234 This opened the door for a wide scope of strategic litigation cases.
Primarily, civil society organization in many occasions took the lead to change a rule or a
decree affecting or related to public interest which will affect huge part of the society.
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One of the recent cases is the case filled by The Egyptian Initiative for Personal rights in
front of the State Council to cancel the decree of the minister of health related to pricing
of the medicines.235 This decree aimed to recalculate the prices of medicines based on
their prices internationally. The importance of this case is that it affected wide part of the
population and was considered a violation of their constitutional right for Health. The
decree was then canceled by the court.
Animal activists who are bothered with the method of killing street cats and dogs have
also undertaken the same path in order to spread awareness of their problem and filled
three cases of a total of forty one claimants in front of the Administrative Judiciary in
2017.236 They aimed to stop killing street cats and dogs and alter to modern ways of
controlling their numbers through sterilizing them.237 However, the court dismissed the
case based on that administrative decrees permitted killing street dogs and cats in a
merciful way. A year later, by the end of 2018, and upon news on social media that the
government aimed to export street dogs and cats to countries to be consumed as food,238
fourteen activists filled a new case, with an urgent request, asking for the cancellation of
this decision and, in addition, stopping the killing of cats and dogs.239 Both of their claims
were denied in the urgent request by the Administrative Judiciary based on the same
grounds adopted in the judgment of its predecessor case.240 Months after this judgment, a
new case was filled again that were trying to change their methodology in front of the
court. The new case was not filled by an urgent request so as it will escape the
administrative Judiciary and go directly to the State Commissioners Authority. Their
claims were also modified as they request in this case only to stop using the Striknine
poison as a cruel way of killing street dogs and cats. Hence, it is clear how animal
activists are still insisting on using the strategic litigation as a path for defending their
cause. Even though they failed not only once, but twice to convince the court of their
point, they kept on filling new cases. Primarily, in order to affect the media that are
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covering news related to the case; thus increasing awareness of general population. Also,
they are changing their strategy of litigation so as to reach better result for this litigation.
Despite this, Egypt in some other aspects restricted public interest litigation through
direct intervention by the legislator.241 In other sectors, like most of gendered based
cases, the court has not adopted a widened aspect for the required personal and direct
interest of the claimant. Consequently, only those who are injured directly could fill the
case. In this regard, the role of civil movement societies and activities in the strategic
litigation is limited to motivating and supporting the claimants. They could not file the
case personally since they do not have the required legal capacity. A clear example for
this, the Egyptian center was able to convince one of the public employees to file a case
to ask for putting a minimum wages for labors.242 The court in the urgent request rules in
favor of the claimant243 which was a deal breaker afterwards for putting the current
minimum wages. For sure this judgment has an effect over millions of Egyptian workers.
Though this judgment was not by itself applied directly, it made a wide debate among
labor syndicate, parties, media and parliament. Due to this awareness, most of the
presidential candidates after the 2011 revolution dedicated their absolute effort to
guarantee setting minimum wages standards which was set and reassessed many times
since then.244
Women’s rights adjudication is not apart from the whole scene of preferring strategic
litigation to deal with public cases. Many cases related to women’s right were brought to
all types of courts whether Constitutional, Ordinary or Administrative Court. Though
most of these cases are not public interest cases, meaning they must be filled by the
directly injured claimants, their effects in most cases extend to other women forming a
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sort of social reform. In this regard, a very important analysis was made by Judge Tahany
El-Gebaly the former president of the Supreme Constitutional Court among others to
evaluate the adjudication of women’s cases in Egyptian courts.245 The rendered
judgments focus mainly on the personal, social and labor rights of women. Many
judgments were issued from the Family court in matters related to the marriage and
maternal rights that upheld women’s rights. One of the most important cases ruled by the
family court is the case related to the right of the child to be named after their parents
depending on the result of the analysis medical DNA for the parties to the matrimonial
relationship. 246 In another famous case the court decided that Moral harm principle could
took place by the act of the husband to stay away from the wife for a year or more, and
this was considered a reason for her divorce for backbiting.247 The Supreme
Administrative Court also in a famous case promoted the women’s right to wear Nikab as
a matter of personal freedom.248
In the matter of labor, women’s rights have been promoted in many cases like the
principle adopted by the Supreme Constitutional Court considering that going out for
work will not be considered as disobedience for her husband since this is related to her
right of working. The rule considered that her right of working is not against the Islamic
Sharia which is considered a powerful limitation for the retrograde concepts adopted by
parts of the society.
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A very important judgment also were rendered from the same

court which insisted that marriage contracts must be authenticated as a social necessity to
secure marriage and save rights and not consider it contrary to the principle of personal
freedom of Islamic Sharia.250
These examples for selecting litigation strategy for defending women’s right over other
tools show how Egyptian courts are a convenient environment for its application.
According to one statistics, number of cases related to women’s rights in the period
between 1990 and 2000 increased by more than the double as compared to the period
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between 2000 till 2010.251 The data also shows that there was insistency from the side of
women’s defenders not only to gain the propaganda required for their problems, but also
to get actual gains on the ground from the court itself. From all the judgments gathered,
there were forty percent of them issued from the courts of first instance and same
percentage from the appealing courts. A percentage of 20 percent was also in favor of
judgments rendered from supreme courts.252 This shows how they are persistent to
challenge judgments that are not suitable to their demands. Another very essential
assessment for the judgments in favor of women’s rights shows that around quarter of
these judgments was the motive for the Egyptian legislator to intervene by solving the
given problem; this is through promulgating a new law, amendment an existing one, or
cancelling it. Moreover, around ten percent of the judgments stipulate for a new legal or
juristic rule in favor of women. This shows how courts are not only used for its ordinary
way of strictly applying existing laws; they are extensively capable of assessing the gaps
between laws and facts of the case in accordance with the Egyptian society.
More than ever now courts are powerful in reviewing matters related to women’s rights
based on the constitution of 2014 which praises equality based on gender and state for the
rights of women explicitly in its provisions. This has given activist the courage to
challenge articles that have long been discriminating against women. It gave the courts
also the legal ground to be able to challenge such articles. In a new precedent the Appeal
Court of Banha referred articles 274 and 276 of the Penal Code to the Supreme
Constitutional Court to review their constitutionality.253 These two articles are related to
the penalty imposed on women in case of adultery while being married. The court
referred them based on inequality between the penalties imposed on women as compared
to men. What is to be noticed in this judgment is that this article was enacted in 1937 and
has been applied since then; only now in 2020 the court was able to review its
constitutionality.
All of these examples of strategic adjudication have proven its importance in affecting
cases which have public importance. Whether the court ended up accepting or rejecting
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the case, most of these cases laid a positive impact on the cause they are defending. For
cases which the court accepted directly, the decision of the court in itself constitutes the
revenue of the battle they are undertaking. Even, sometimes, the government exceeds the
narrow scope of the judgment through opening a wide discussion with competent parties
in order to reach a better solution.254 In other cases, where the court rejected the case like
in the case of exporting the gas to Israel, the government where forced to reconsider its
pricing for selling gas to internal factories and price of exporting which in other terms
lead to the same result that the court case was trying to reach. It is to be mentioned that
these judgments did not influence only its litigants but many interests of other people.
The court reassured the existence of a negative administrative decree in which the
government must have undertaken in a certain case. Court has also expanded the concept
of capacity and interests of claimants which opened the door for more cases of strategic
litigation.255
It is very important to understand that adjudicating any public cases must be well
approached in order not to result in reverse consequences. In addition to the prementioned conditions that must be existent in order that strategic litigation takes effect,
perspective cases must be well prepared and its consequences evaluated. 256 Choosing the
subject that could be litigated depends on actual facts that are surrounding it and who are
going to be interested from this judgment. In addition, selecting the right timing for the
initiation of the procedures and being able to mobilize different players to support the
case, as well as studying the legal precedents of similar case will lead to the best outcome
from adjudication.257
The reason is that if the strategic litigation failed in courts and did not empathize the
public opinion towards its goals, this might lead to immunizing the given rule or decree
and empower it with the interface of reasonableness and legality it requires. Failing to
study all the variables before initiating the case and after failing in the courts might give a
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general view that this given case is not legal and that those who defend its position are
not supporting the right side.
C. Adjudicating Nationality law no 154 of 2004
As previously mentioned, the legislator adopted both the acquisition of nationality based
on blood bond and naturalization as grounds for passing the nationality from the Egyptian
mother to her children. This interaction from the legislator side, though on one side might
seem significant, lead to a new cycle of patriarchal classification. In this regard, courts
were used as a suitable mean of highlighting the major deficiencies in the nationality law.
In this part I will show how the strategic litigation was used to tackle the gender
inequality in nationality law. Afterwards, I will assess how much strategic litigation
contributed towards the goal of gender equality in nationality.
1. First generation:
The law258 was promulgated to eliminate the discrimination between men and women in
passing their nationality to their children. The new law has been introduced to correct two
situations relating to the Egyptian mother marrying a foreigner. First, the legislator
interfered to regulate the position of the children of the Egyptian women in the future.
Thus, article 2 of the law no 26 of 1975259 was substituted by article 2 of the new
amendment in which its final phrasing is “anyone who is born to an Egyptian father or
mother would be deemed as Egyptian”.260 Article 4 of this amendment stipulates that this
law would be enforceable starting from the next day of its publishing. Accordingly, all
children that would be born for an Egyptian mother after 15th of July 2004 will be
considered Egyptians automatically by the force of law same as what was applied for
Egyptian fathers. By this interference from the legislator side, the situation of the
Egyptian mother who gave birth to a child after 2004 is apparently equal to that of
Egyptian men.
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However, the ministry of interior issued a decree as an executive regulation for the
amendment law no. 154 which required those who were born for an Egyptian mother
after the amendment to submit a request for the Immigration National Authority, the
Egyptian embassies or the Civil Status Authority in order to issue a decree from the
ministry of interior.
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This decree, thus, contradicts with the essence of the legislator’s

intent. It imposes a new restriction over those who were born after the law without
relying on any ground from the law itself.262 Those people have the right to obtain the
nationality originally through blood bond without the need of taking any extra procedure.
Unfortunately, this decree has not been cancelled until now.
Nevertheless, the case of children born for Egyptian women before this date is not
resolved by this article. Also, there might be many other generations’ subsidiary to these
children that were deprived from the Egyptian nationality, which is formed from this
distortion in which all of these generations did not get the nationality. Consequently, the
legislator regulated in article 3 the situation of children born before the pre-mentioned
date of enforcement of the law. The first paragraph of this article states that those who
were born before the date of enforcement of the law must manifest their interest to
acquire the Egyptian nationality to the ministry of interior. Accordingly, he would be
considered Egyptian by either a decision made by the ministry of interior, or by the lapse
of a period of one year from the date of manifestation unless a reasoned decision is issued
with the refusal of granting the nationality. 263
From the first glance, it could seems that this part filled the missing blanks. However, this
article encompasses many difficulties as a result of its phrasing and how it has been
applied by the administrative authorities. Unlike children who were born to Egyptian
mother after the new amendment, it is clear that those who were born before it must go
through certain procedures and file a request in order to obtain the Egyptian nationality.
This is a distinct situation since children of Egyptian mothers who were born after the
amendment and children of Egyptian fathers in all cases do not need to initiate or
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undertake any procedure. They can take a birth certificate immediately stating that they
are Egyptians.
The reason behind this procedural inequality finds its roots in the core differentiation
made by the legislator for the legal ground of obtaining the Egyptian nationality between
the Egyptian father and the Egyptian mother after the amendment on one side, and the
Egyptian mother before the amendment on the other side. The legislator considered the
nationality of children of the latter as naturalization “acquired nationality” whereas the
nationality of the former is considered acquired by blood. 264 The nationality driven from
blood bond is also referred to as the original nationality in an implied indicative that it is
aquired by force of law without any need of taking any procedures.
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This

discrimination was not the result of wrong interpretation of the legislator or the abuse of
power by the administrative authority. It is clear from the explanatory note of the
amendment law no 154 that the idea of discrimination between the Egyptian mother
before the law and after it was on the table during the deliberation on the law. 266
Subsequently, this situation was the mere intention of the legislator.
This inequality resulted that those who were born before the amendment will acquire the
nationality only from the day of the decision of the minister of interior not from the date
of their birth.267 Thus, they will not be deemed as born Egyptian same as how children of
Egyptian father are treated. The problem could be noticed if a person born for an
Egyptian mother, before the amendment, did not take his nationality except through a
judicial award in a date later than the amendment. His children that were born before this
date even if it was after the issuance of the new law in 2004 will not be considered
Egyptians. They will have to acquire a decision rendered from the ministry of interior
with the same procedure taken by his mother and his nationality will be considered an
acquired one. However, if the same person got a new born after the judgment rendered
for his first child, his new born will take the nationality immediately by force of law and
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blood bond. Moreover, since those who were born before the law no 154 are considered
an acquired nationality, they will be subject to the decree of the Ministry of Interior no
1197 of 1975 which forces those who apply for an acquired nationality to submit a
certificate of their criminal status. Thus, a new procedure and a new restriction are
imposed over them.
In addition, some literatures assume that this differentiation will lead to discrimination in
exercising their political rights.268 According to the nationality law no 26 of 1975 “any
foreigner who acquires the Egyptian nationality in accordance with article 3, 4, 6 and 7
will not be able to exercise his political right until the lase of a period of 5 years from the
time of acquiring the nationality”.269 He cannot also be elected or appointed in any
parliamentary body.270 Though it is understood from this article that it is applied only on
the aforementioned articles, and the children of Egyptian mother are not addressed with
its terms since they are regulated by different articles,271 they still acquire the nationality
on the same concept of those addressed by the aforementioned articles. All of them
acquire the nationality as naturalization. Thus, they are expected to be subject to the rules
of this article as well.272 Accordingly, this discrimination has a big significance on
children of Egyptian mother before 2004.
In addition, based on the aforementioned discriminatory regulation, those who were born
for an Egyptian mother must submit a request to the ministry of interior on a set
template.273 This request must be attached with the documents that prove the nationality
of the child. For instance, they must submit the birth nationality of the Egyptian mother,
her father and her child. In addition, a new law was rendered in 2018 that increased the
due fees for this request to be 10,000 Egyptian pounds instead of 50 pounds.274 This
increase is considered a heavy burden on the shoulders of those who were addressed with
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this law. This matter was addressed by the court in one of the cases but the court did not
impose this fee on the claimant since he filled his case before publishing the new law.275
Regardless of the fees needed to be paid, the Supreme Administrative Court through its
consecutive judgments managed to find a solution for the prerequisite template that
should be filled before filing a lawsuit. In many cases, the representative of the
administrative authority claims that the plaintiff did not file a request on the required
template before filing his case.276 The court rejected this ground of defense since the
administrative authority is presuming the case and defending its position while ignoring
the request of the claimant which is considered a disclosure of its refusal, and requesting
the filling the template is thus a useless procedure.277
In addition, the children of Egyptian mother must wait for the lapse of the period of year
in order to be considered Egyptians unless the Ministry of Interior issued a decision
before that date by either giving him the nationality or refusing with a reasoned
decree.278Accordingly, the legislator left the acceptance or refusal of granting the
nationality in the hands of the executive authority as a mandatory condition for acquiring
the nationality.279 Thus, there is not a guarantee that those who were born before the
amendment no 154 would acquire the nationality. It is clear that the decision is left for
the discretionary power of the executive power since the law has not stipulated for any
objective standards as a restriction for its enhanced power.280 The only limitation that
exists on this absolute power is that they must give a reasoned decree for refusal so as the
court can review their justification. This is considered a massive derogation for women’s
rights in this amendment. Not only they do not acquire the nationality from the aspect of
blood bond and encumbered with many procedural restrictions, they also does not
guarantee acquiring the nationality.
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Again the Supreme Administrative Court opposed claims raised by the administrative
authority claiming that they have the full discretionary power to grant the Egyptian
nationality in the aforementioned case. The court ruled that the legislator required only
one condition which is to be born for an Egyptian mother, and it did not grant the
administrative authority any discretionary power. Accordingly, the administrative
authority cannot refuse granting the Egyptian nationality to a person who is born for an
Egyptian mother.281 Accordingly, through strategic litigation, granting nationality became
liberated from the discretionary power of the administrative authority. Though
administrative authority still opposing this interpretation adopted by the administrative
court,282 this opposition will only lead to lengthen of procedures and will not affect the
right of passing the nationality.
Finally, the legislator acknowledged the right of Egyptian women after the law no 154 to
pass their nationality to their children irrespective of the nationality of his father or
whether he is anonymous or not. However, the legislator failed again to fill the gaps
while phrasing the rights of Egyptian women before the law. He stipulated that “those
who are born for an Egyptian mother and a non-Egyptian father”283 and continued stating
the cases of granting the nationality. However, this wording presumed that the father
must be known.284 Since we cannot deduce that the father is not Egyptian unless he is
known. Subsequently, if an Egyptian mother has a child from an unknown father, she will
not be able to pass her nationality to him according to this law. The only article that was
regulating this issue was stated in article 3 of the law 26 of 1975. This article was deleted
since the new amendment cured this situation from its roots. However, this left the
children of mother from an unknown father before the law no. 154 deprived from the
Egyptian nationality.
2. Second Generation:
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The legislator continued in article 3 his path towards regulating all the possible cases of
those who were born for an Egyptian mother before the amendment. As we have
mentioned before those who acquires the nationality according to this article will be
considered as a naturalization nationality, and they will be considered Egyptians only
from the date of obtaining it. Thus, if those who were born for an Egyptian mother before
the law no. 154 have had children for their own, in other words grandchildren of the
Egyptian mother, before they obtain the nationality, they will not be considered
Egyptians as their parents had not obtained their Egyptian nationality at the time of their
birth, and as we have previously illustrated their parents nationality will not have a
retroactive effect.285 Accordingly, the legislator interfered and regulated this case.
We have two cases in which the grandchildren could obtain their nationality. The first is
that those who were born for an Egyptian mother is still alive and obtained the Egyptian
nationality according to the first paragraph of article 3. In this case, if the grandchildren
of the Egyptian mother are minors they will obtain the Egyptian nationality automatically
immediately along with their parent.286 However, if they reached the age of majority, they
need to take the same procedures same as their parents. It is thus clear how a family born
to an Egyptian mother could suffer from long exhausting procedures and very long time
in order to acquire their Egyptian nationality. If the grandchildren of the Egyptian mother
are adults, they need to wait for their father first to prove his nationality which will take
in a best case scenario a period of one year. Then they could apply to acquire their
nationality which will take another year if there is not any objection from the executive
authorities.
However, a critical gap appeared nowadays as the legislator only aimed at regulating the
second generation of children of the Egyptian mother “grandchildren”. Though this,
nothing in the law has regulated the case of 3rd generations287. Some of the grandchildren
that have been addressed by the second paragraph of article 3 did not get their nationality
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directly after the publishing of the law.288 Accordingly, they got children “3rd generation”
before acquiring the Egyptian nationality officially. Those children at the time of birth are
born for both foreign parents so they are not addressed by the amendment of law no 154
as it is only applied for those who were born to either an Egyptian father or mother. Thus,
this generation and the following will be deprived of the Egyptian nationality without any
justification or a valid reason.
Due to this pragmatic problem that was faced by the court in many cases, the
Administrative Court referred article 3 paragraph 2 to the Supreme Constitutional
Court.289 The court found this paragraph could be deemed unconstitutional since it grants
only children of the Egyptian mother and her grandchildren the Egyptian nationality
while ignoring the case of following generations which is discriminatory rule. Thus, the
principle of equality in front of the law which is adopted by all the consecutive
constitutions is breached. It has also violated the rights and liberties adopted by the
current constitution especially as it aims to eliminate all sort of discriminations.
On the other hand, the other case is where the children of the Egyptian mother died
before the enactment of the amendment no. 154 while having children for their own
“grandchildren of the Egyptian mother”. There is no doubt that before there death they
did not get the nationality as they died before the new amendment. Thus, the legislator
interfered to give their children “grandchildren of Egyptian mother” the Egyptian
nationality. He stipulated that those grandchildren can acquire the Egyptian nationality by
the same procedures that are stipulated for those whose parents did not die.
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The

legislator intended by this regulation to fill all the gaps that might exist for those who
were born for an Egyptian mother. However, the legislator missed to regulate the case
were those who were born for an Egyptian mother died after the law without applying to
acquire the Egyptian nationality. In this case, the grandchildren of the Egyptian mother
that their parent died after the law will not be able to apply to take the nationality; since
as we have illustrated before their nationality is dependent on the nationality of their
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parent. These grandchildren must not bear the intentional or unintentional decision of
their parents when they decided not to apply to acquire the Egyptian nationality.
The Supreme Administrative Court did not adopt this understanding and referred
paragraph 3 of article 3 to the Supreme Constitutional Court based on that the blood bond
was cut by the death of the child of the Egyptian mother. Hence, the grandchildren do not
have the right to acquire the nationality since nationality stands on a bondage that links
this person to the nationality, and in this case there is not any connection between him
and the community. Thus, since the child of the Egyptian mother did not get the Egyptian
nationality, hence, the grandchildren were born for both foreign parents.291 On the
contrary, the State Commissioners Authority did not adopt this perspective and
recommended the referral of the case to the Supreme Constitutional Court based on that
grandchildren whose parents died after the law must have the nationality same as those
died before it.
Apart from all of these deficiencies, the Egyptian administrative authority has kept on
refusing to give the Egyptian nationality to children of the Egyptian mother where the
father is a Palestinian.292 This position was justified by referring to the League of Arab
States decision in 1959 prohibiting any Arab country from passing their nationality to
Palestinians in order to preserve the Palestinian identity.
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Accordingly, all of them

were deprived of the Egyptian nationality even though this decision was merely a
recommendation for the Arab member states to facilitate the Palestinian accommodation
in their lands while keeping their Palestinian nationality as a general concept. Regardless
of the fact that this cannot be a ground to suspend the applicability of a law, there is not
an objective reason to deprive those Palestinian who were born before the law from the
Egyptian nationality and giving those who were born after the law the nationality by the
power of law.294 This Supreme Administrative Court judgment upheld the perspective
adopted by this court on refusing the claim of the Administrative authority regarding the
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Palestinian people. The court relied on that the decision made by the Arab League was
not considered as a treaty. Thus is not considered binding.295
3. Left Over Gender Discriminatory Articles
The issue of passing Egyptian nationality from Egyptian mother to her children was not
the only discriminatory part of the nationality law. In fact, many of the articles of the
nationality were directed, primarily, to men by considering them the household of the
family. All other discriminatory articles are based on naturalization, but are directed only
to men. Although the legislator interfered to solve the problem of the Egyptian mother, he
ignored other articles that are discriminating against women. In article 4, the legislator
gives the right for the ministry of interior to grant naturalization nationality to Egyptian
men who were born for father whose origin is from Egypt.296 This article is directly
ignoring the equal treatment of women in the same circumstances. Similarly, article 6
and 7 of the nationality law is explicitly eliminating women from their jurisdiction.
Article 6 give foreign men only, who acquire the Egyptian nationality, the power of
passing the Egyptian acquired nationality to his wife and children based on the
requirements stipulated in the law.297 Similarly, article 7 stipulates the requirements in
which foreign women could acquire the Egyptian nationality in case of marrying an
Egyptian citizen.
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Oppositely, Egyptian women who married a foreigner will not be

able to pass her nationality to him.
Article 6 was declared, in an important judgment from the Supreme Constitutional
Court, as unconstitutional based on the articles of the constitution that are eliminating
discrimination between men and women. The court stated that the legal rules must not be
interpreted apart from its goals and the legal framework of the law and constitution.299
Hence, nationality law articles cannot be contradicting with the spirit of the constitution
that praised women rights and tend to eliminate all sort of inequality in gender. It stated
also that the CEDAW convention imposes a legal liability on the government to intervene
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and amend all the current laws to be consistent with its rules. This judgment is considered
one of the most recent victories for women’s right achieved by activists through
strategical litigation. Though this judgment has long been waited, it finally paved the way
for similar ruling from the Supreme Constitutional Court in favor of women’s equality in
the nationality law.
D. Assessment of the current position:
As we have seen before, women have long been fighting for gaining their full rights as
Egyptian citizens. They were long before considered as subordinate to men;300 hence, a
second degree citizen. Since nationality law is the international term used to define
citizenship, having discrimination in nationality law means a defection in citizenship in
whole, which is considered a cornerstone for the rights women have always been trying
to achieve. The amendment of the nationality law no 154 of 2004 was one of the major
developments on their path to achieve equity.
However, though this amendment gave part of women some of their deprived rights.
According to ZamZam, the legislator with this perspective made the status of the children
of the Egyptian mother unstable since giving them the nationality through a decree makes
this decree subject to annulment based on incompetence, lack of reason, and violation of
law.301 In addition, the law did not equate between men and women in passing the
Egyptian nationality by the blood right. The discrimination based on gender, thus,
continued and citizenship equality is not achieved.302
The strategic litigation used in order to cut down all deformations existing in nationality
law in accordance with women’s right was very successful in altering some of the
discriminating articles. The judicial perspective for handling cases of nationality has
been very progressive. Based on the articles of the constitution related to rights and
liberties and the intention of the legislator in the amendment number 154 of 2004, the
judgments were able to overcome many struggles facing the application of the law. Most
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importantly, it deprived the administrative authority from the power to decide over the
nationality of children of the Egyptian mother. The pre-requisite condition of submitting
a request was also overruled through deciding that filing the case itself is equivalent to
submitting a request. Other articles that were contradicting with the essence of the
constitution and nationality law were referred by the court to the Supreme Constitutional
Court to decide on its constitutionality.
Apart from its progressive path, the judicial effort to overcome the problematic
consequences resulting from the amendment of nationality law was not enough. First of
all, though Administrative Judiciary Court set its ruling that the ministry of interior does
not have the power to reject giving the nationality to children of Egyptian mother, the
administrative authority kept on issuing decrees of refusal that will be referred afterwards
as cases to courts.303 Meanwhile, the court cases take a long time for a final decision to be
available and enforceable. This is considered very devastating for those who are seeking
the nationality due to their accommodation problems in Egypt and cost of litigation.
In addition, the judgments issued by the Administrative Judiciary for referring cases to
the Supreme Constitutional Court mostly take a long period of time until it is rendered.
For example, we can see that the case referred by the administrative Judiciary to the
Supreme constitutional Court on the constitutionality of paragraph 3 of article 3 of the
law 154 0f 2004 was referred in 2013 and there is not a judgment rendered until now. 304
Though the step of referring this article to Supreme Court by itself is considered a
progressive step in strategic litigation, the longtime of litigation might weaken the overall
movement and support for this problem. This is not the only problem. The issue is that
though there is an inequality felt on the ground, however, we do not guarantee the
outcome of the court judgment. In fact, the Supreme Constitutional Court recently
rejected to grant the nationality for the following generations of the grandchildren of the
Egyptian mother after four years of waiting for the judgment.305 The court in this regard
declared that this is a matter exclusively in the hands of the legislator and the court has no
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power to impose a new exception for granting the Egyptian nationality. 306 Hence, the
court might not be able to solve the problem since the court only applies rule of law
derived from the constitution. Hence, from a legal perspective the issue might not be
solved.
There are many other aspects that were not solved like the fact that children of Egyptian
mother born before 2004 acquire the nationality as naturalization not by the blood right.
Thus, they will be deprived of their political rights for five years after the date of
acquiring the nationality.307 They will still require applying for acquiring the nationality
and waiting for the period of 1 year to lapse. They will pay extra fees that are not charged
for women who give birth to children after the amendment.308 Accordingly, the inequality
in citizenship rights between the two genders still is not fully solved. 309
Reasons behind this could lie behind the limitations existing around strategic litigation in
Egypt. The legal framework in Egypt, though as previously proven could be considered
suitable for strategic litigation, has failed to permit direct litigation from civil movement
organizations and activists challenging patriarchal clauses directly in nationality law. The
reason is that State Council has long applied the requirement of direct and personal injury
in these cases and did not widen the aspect of claimant interest. Hence, activists cannot
challenge the constitutionality of any article of the nationality law unless there exist a
lawsuit filed by a claimant who has direct interest to challenge an administrative
decree.310 This limitation could be an obstacle for the activists on the ground to be able
to prepare the required mobilization and propaganda for the case of gender discrimination
in nationality law. Thus, the gender inequality problem in the nationality law lacks the
broad support from the society. This limits the outcomes of strategic litigation in
nationality law.
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The problem of inequality in citizenship is not only a matter of law deficiency, but also
due to the reluctant behavior of the administrative authority. Many cases, for example, for
Egyptian women who were married to Palestinian men before the amendment were raised
in front of the administrative court due to the refusals rendered by the ministry of
interior.311 These decrees were justified as a matter of security reasons. The issue is that
security reason could not be a reasonable ground for all of these refusals since Egyptian
women who are married to Palestinian man and gave birth after the amendment will pass
the Egyptian nationality automatically without any interference from the ministry of
interior’s side.312 So there is no sense in depriving these children of the nationality if born
before the amendment for security reasons while giving it to them by the force of law if
they are born after it. The issue about security reason could be solved, if existent, through
first applying the law and granting the Egyptian nationality, and, afterwards, if there is
any proven clues the administrative authority could drop their nationality based on the
existence of one of the conditions required in the nationality law.
Though litigation in general and strategic litigation specifically could be very useful in
some cases where it will succeed to grant women some of their deprived rights, it cannot
solve by its own the paradigm of patriarchy in nationality law. Due to the nature of
adjudication itself, strategic litigation is contributing as a tool for social reform, but
cannot by itself achieve full gender equality. In addition to the limitations imposed on
court due to its nature, courts are competent of interpreting the articles of the law not to
change it.
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V.

Conclusion

Patriarchy prevails in Egyptian society and its legal structure. This is despite the fact that
successive governments in Egypt have introduced some progressive development to
promote gender equality. Those contributions remain far from enhancing the current
situation; the legal scene is still characterized by being patriarchal. This malfunctioning
ideology is part of our legal system. Most of the constituting committees that formed
Egypt constitutions were either lacking any female representation or with a minimal one.
This of course has impacted the articles of the constitution and the entire legal structure
afterwards. Even the current constitution which is the most progressive one is formed by
a male dominant committee. Hence, even if women do enjoy a slight protection under its
articles, the idea of men controlling the amount of

rights given to women is still

patriarchal. In addition, laws whether new or old contain many deficiencies whether
explicit or implicit. In a society where women are raised on the idea that their place
should be in the home, giving only minor modifications in the legal system will look like
a victory for women’s rights. Unfortunately, this is not the case. One change or a couple
of them does not alter the fundamental patriarchal composition of the society.
Taking nationality law as an example, we find that the amendment law no. 154 of 2004
did not end gender discrimination in nationality law. The patriarchal composition long
existed before the amendment, and has continued to exist after it. After the practical
application of the amendment of the nationality law, it is obvious that this amendment
has failed to give the direct legal equity for Egyptian women in the nationality law. Even
strategic litigation of gender inequality in nationality law has failed, on its own, to solve
the problem. Many reasons lay behind this outcome. The fact that cases related to
strategic litigation must be well studied and evaluated might be one of the reasons. In
addition, the law includes many deficiencies that need more than adjudication to solve.
Strategic litigation can be beneficial to spread awareness of discrimination or to alter the
inequality of a certain issue, but putting the burden of achieving gender equality on
strategic litigation is not constructive. Many points and inequalities that resulted in many
cases have led to the dispersion of efforts exerted to highlight problems of inequalities in
the nationality law. Another reason is that civil society organizations and activists have
60

not given this topic an appropriate level of attention which has led subsequently to the
lack of public support and awareness of this problem. Thus, other channels for putting
pressure to alter the situation are lacking. These channels are very important since courts
only perform in a legal realm. Hence, other areas where a court might be restricted to
trespass on due to its nature, considered as a social need more than being a legal right,
have been left either with a rejection from the court or with a total ignorance from all
parties.
In addition, taking into account the nature of court judgements, we can deduce that they
are not considered a decisive method for confronting patriarchy that is deeply distorting
the social system. A court judgment might in some cases favor the women’s side in a way
that some right will be upheld. However, the whole battle of gender inequality will not be
changed.313 Though patriarchy might be challenged sometimes through strategic
litigation, this will not lead to the collective social organization.314 A clear example of
this is the numerous lawsuits brought by members of the majorities claiming that giving
the minority groups privileges will be considered discriminating against them.315 Hence
settling the problem of discrimination through litigation will only be considered a cover
up for the bigger problems rooted in society.
In this regard, there have been many suggestions for solving the problem of equity of
Egyptian mother’s children. Some literature calls for the absolute equity between men
and women.316 Others suggest the same absolute equity while giving the children of
Egyptian mothers the right to abandon the nationality.317 This suggestion is made since
the nationality is a bilateral bond that also relies on reciprocal interest. For this, those
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children might not want to acquire the Egyptian nationality in order not to be under any
obligation enforced by the state.318 However, in order to avoid imposing the nationality
on those who were born before the law, the current problematic solution were adopted.
All of these recommendations fall under a new amendment. Though this effort is
appreciated and encouraged, it must not be done in isolation of the whole context of
patriarchy in the Egyptian legal system.
Accordingly, since nationality law is only one of the products of legal system that
advocates patriarchy in a society that has long been attributed to male dominance, women
should not rely on common practices for achieving equality in the nationality law.
Though law and adjudication might contribute to obtaining more privileges, the core
subject of patriarchy will continue to exist. Women should take apart its social, political,
economic and legal manifestations with and without using law. 319 It must not be ignored
that, though women currently represent a quarter of the members of the People’s
Assembly, the dominant impetus for any law will be for men. Hence, ignoring the real
problem that widespread in the legal system and trying to solve the problem with
previously used methods will only lead to a new cycle of gender inequality.
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